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1Abstract
We analyze innovation race in a moral hazard setting. We develop a
model in which two competing entrepreneurs work independently on the
same project. The entrepreneurs do not possess any wealth of their own and
their research is ¯nanced by a venture capitalist. The project, if successful,
generates a prize, which is to be shared between the winning entrepreneur
and the venture capitalist. The venture capitalist cannot observe the al-
location of funds he provides, which creates a moral hazard problem. We
compare a competitive setting with a benchmark case where the venture
capitalist ¯nances only one entrepreneur. We show that the venture capi-
talist can increase the e±ciency of research (hence, his own expected pro¯t
from investments) and alleviate the moral hazard problem if he ¯nances
both entrepreneurs. This conclusion is unambiguous, when the entrepre-
neurs are at the same (the last) stage of R&D. It holds for a reasonably
large range of parameters, when the entrepreneurs are at di®erent stages of
R&D.
Keywords: venture capital, moral hazard, optimal contract, innovation race
JEL Classi¯cation: G32, G34, O31
21 Introduction
One of the most important problems in venture capital ¯nancing is the separation
of ¯nancing decisions, made by a venture capitalist, and allocation decisions, made
by recipient ¯rms or entrepreneurs. Venture capital funds are usually directed to
projects of uncertain quality, where neither time nor ¯nancial recourses needed for
successful completion of the project are known ex ante. As a rule, venture capital-
ists are actively involved in monitoring ¯rms in their portfolio. Nevertheless, they
can rarely control perfectly whether resources are allocated e±ciently, since such
control requires an expertise which often only an entrepreneur himself possesses.
This creates a moral hazard problem: entrepreneurs tend to misallocate the funds
provided by the venture capitalist. In particular, they either may divert part of
the funds for their own uses, or may allocate them into activities that have high
personal return but create little market value.
The venture capital literature has extensively discussed contractual arrange-
ments which can be used by a venture capitalist in order to alleviate the moral haz-
ard problem. These are, for example, convertible securities (Kaplan and Stromberg
2003), monitoring mechanisms (Gompers 1995), and stage ¯nancing (Bergemann
and Hege 2000). Those mechanisms are e±cient in mitigating the agency con°ict.
However, they are costly and complicated, which creates obstacles for e±cient
funding of research and development. In this paper, as opposed to the existing
literature on venture capital, we investigate how a non-contractual mechanism,
namely competition between ¯rms in the portfolio of the venture capitalist, can
be used to mitigate the agency con°ict. The main question which we address is
whether a venture capitalist can increase the e±ciency of R&D and his own pro¯t
by creating competition between his portfolio entrepreneurs. Although we formu-
late the problem in terms of venture capital ¯nancing, it is of equal importance
for grant agencies and for R&D process within the ¯rms.
Casual empirical evidence suggests that venture capital funds and similar in-
stitutions sometimes indeed ¯nance R&D race between competitive ¯rms. It is
also not unusual for grant agencies to ¯nance competing research projects. For
example, from 38;000 projects, the National Institute of Health proposed to grant
and support in its 2006 budget, more than a quarter should be developed by
competing teams.1 Similarly, Vulcan Inc., a multi-division corporation owned by
Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, has contracted three competing agencies for the
project Halo, aimed at the development of the problem-solving software.2
In this paper we investigate conditions, which make the ¯nancing of competing
projects desirable. An obvious ine±ciency created by competing projects is du-
1See the report of the National Institute of Health (2005).
2See www.projecthalo.com for details.
3plication of e®orts. However, competition also allows to increase the probability
of success, since two entrepreneurs succeed more often, than one (\scale" e®ect of
competition). Moreover, we argue that in a moral hazard setting competition is
e±cient in mitigating the agency problem, since it disciplines entrepreneurs and
limits the rent which they can extract from the venture capitalist (\disciplining"
e®ect of competition). Hence, competition is a bene¯cial arrangement from the
venture capitalist's point of view, if its positive e®ects outweighs the duplication
of R&D costs.
Analyzing the innovation race between competing entrepreneurs we consider a
research process which consists of two sequential stages, which are observable and
veri¯able outcomes of R&D, such as patent or results of a test. This structure
allows us to investigate the e®ect of competition between entrepreneurs which are
at the same or at di®erent stages of research. In the former case we focus on for
situation where both entrepreneurs are on the last stage of R&D. We conclude,
that in this situation the competition is unambiguously bene¯cial for the venture
capitalist: he will always prefer to employ two entrepreneurs. In the latter case,
one of the entrepreneurs is a leader (i.e., he is at the ¯nal stage of research) and
the other is a follower (i.e., he is at the initial stage of research). In this case
we also conclude that competition is an e®ective cure against moral hazard: it
disciplines agents, by making diversion of funds less lucrative, than in the absence
of competition, and increases the research horizon. We show that without moral
hazard the venture capitalist would almost always ¯nance only the most advanced
entrepreneur. With moral hazard in place, however, the range of parameters where
competition is bene¯cial increases signi¯cantly.
This paper is related to two strands of literature: the literature on innovation
races and the literature on venture capital. It contributes to the former by consid-
ering innovation races in the moral hazard setting and to the latter by addressing
the ¯nancing of competing projects.
The model which we develop in this paper shares several features with the
literature on innovation races, such as costly experimentation framework and
\learning-while-investing." However, majority of models of innovation race con-
sider the investment decisions of rival ¯rms that are modelled as independent
entities, which carry all costs of R&D and expropriate the whole pro¯t from the
investment (Lee and Wilde 1980, Reinganum 1981, Choi 1991). We contribute to
the existing literature by addressing innovation race in the moral-hazard setting.
Namely, we consider a situation in which the ¯nancing decisions (made by the ven-
ture capitalist) and the allocation decisions (made by the ¯rm or entrepreneur) are
decentralized. Decentralization creates a moral hazard problem, since the entre-
preneurs face a temptation to divert funds for private consumption, rather than
to invest them in research and development.
In the literature on venture capital ¯nancing, we are aware of few papers that
4investigate the e®ect of competition between the portfolio ¯rms of the venture cap-
italist. Inderst and Munnich (2003) consider the decisions of a wealth-constrained
venture capitalist in a static framework. Portfolio ¯rms in their model do not
compete on the product market, but they do compete for the funds. The authors
show that this setting improves the ability of the venture capitalist to deal with
the agency problem. As opposed to Inderst and Munnich (2003), we consider the
entrepreneurs, who compete for the introduction of a new product. Therefore,
the setup of our model is close to the setup of an innovation race. We study the
decision of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneurs in a dynamic framework,
where in each period of time the entrepreneurs have to experiment (that is, to
invest in research and development) in order to achieve success. The dynamic
setting allows us to investigate how reward of the entrepreneurs and decisions of
venture capitalist depend on time and the position, which each entrepreneur has
in the race.
Levitt (1995) analyzes a problem of a principal whose payo® depends on the
best of agents' outputs. Unlike in our model, the author investigates a static
situation, which does not allow to consider a competition between the leader and
the follower or to investigate how the terms of contract change with the number
of completed stages. Likewise, the framework of the model does not allow the
author to make any concrete conclusions in case when the production technologies
of agents are independent. We address these issues in our model.
Our approach is closely related to that of Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2000,
2002). They investigate decision of a venture capitalist who ¯nances a single
entrepreneur under uncertainty about the quality of the project and investments
needed for its successful realization. Bergemann and Hege (1998) analyze a model
in which the quality of a project is not known and has to be resolved through
a costly experiment. Their main result is that agency costs lead to ine±ciently
early stopping of the project. In their second model Bergemann and Hege (2000)
extend these results and show the di®erence between relationship ¯nancing and
arm-length ¯nancing. Finally, in the third model Bergemann and Hege (2002)
investigate the value of staged ¯nancing. The authors show that use of ¯nancing
rounds (stages) allows the increase of the funding horizon and makes it closer to
the socially optimal horizon.
We use the framework of the Bergemann and Hege models and introduce com-
petition between entrepreneurs. We show that competition has a disciplining e®ect
and mitigates the agency problem. We argue that in the presence of competition
the venture capitalist is willing to ¯nance the research and development longer,
than without competition. Finally, we develop the optimal contract for the case of
competing entrepreneurs and investigate how the terms of the contract depend on
the costs of R&D and on the probability of success. Our results hold in ¯nite time
and to justify this assumption we discuss the bene¯ts of commitment to a ¯nite
5research horizon and the commitment mechanism, which is relevant for venture
capital-like institutions.
The structure of this paper is the following. We describe the set-up of the model
in Section 2 and derive the sequentially optimal contract in Sections 3 and 4. We
introduce strategic interaction among entrepreneurs in Section 5 and discuss the
advantage of commitment to ¯nite horizon in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Proofs and results of numerical simulations can be found in Appendix A.
2 Description of the model
2.1 The model
There are two entrepreneurs with no wealth of their own. Both have an idea (a
project) how to solve a particular problem. For example, they try to ¯nd a cure
against a disease. Following Bergemann and Hege (2002), we assume that for a
successful completion of the project, each entrepreneur has to complete N sequen-
tial stages. These stages are observable and veri¯able outcomes, such as a patent,
¯rst version of a product, results of markets tests, etc. The stages are sequential
in the sense that in order to enter in the k-th stage each entrepreneur has to ¯nish
successfully (k ¡ 1) previous stages. Financing of the projects is done by venture
capitalist who provides necessary funds. If all stages are completed, the project
generates a prize R and the prize is to be divided between the venture capital-
ist and the winning entrepreneur. We assume that the winner has a monopoly
over the project (he patents his invention), hence the second entrepreneur does
not generate any value. Entrepreneurs and the venture capitalist are risk neutral
individuals with common discount rate r.
In order to successfully ¯nish a stage, the entrepreneur has to allocate an
amount c (provided by the venture capitalist) into the project. In that case the
stage is completed in the current period with probability p. With probability 1¡p
the entrepreneur does not succeed and has to invest further (conditional on the
fact that his rival has not yet won the race).3 Following Lee and Wilde (1980) and
Reinganum (1981) we assume that event of achieving a success in each period is
independent across the entrepreneurs and across time. Finance are provided by
the venture capitalist, but allocation decisions are made by entrepreneurs. They
can either invest funds or divert them for private uses. The venture capitalist
is not able to observe the allocation decision. All he can observe is a success
(completion of the current stage) or an absence of success (which can either mean
3We assume that the entrepreneurs are identical, which implies that the probability of success
p is the same for both entrepreneurs.
6that an entrepreneur has invested money but failed, or that he has diverted it).4
We will analyze a model where N = 2, i.e., in order to win the prize R an
entrepreneur has to complete successfully two stages. Bergemann and Hege (2002)
analyze a model with one entrepreneur and N stages. However, for more than one
entrepreneur the analysis of the multistage game becomes extremely complicated.
In spite of this limitation, our model enables us to illustrate the importance of
competition between the entrepreneurs in venture capital ¯nancing. Finally, we
will assume that Rp > 2c. This condition is necessary and su±cient for ¯nancing
at least one entrepreneur.
2.2 De¯nitions and notations
We will call regime (i=j) a situation, where one entrepreneur has i successes (he has
successfully completed i stages) and the other entrepreneur has j successes, where
i;j 2 f0;1g. In this paper we consider a situation in which the entrepreneurs
are initially in the regime (1=0), i.e., there is a leader (an entrepreneur, who
already had one success) and a follower (an entrepreneur, who has zero successes).
Therefore, we analyze ¯nancing in regimes (1=0) and (1=1).
We will use the following notation:
² C
ij
k denotes a contract is applied in regime (i=j), where contracts are indexed
by k = 1;2;:::. As will be clari¯ed below, a contract between the venture
capitalist and an entrepreneur speci¯es a reward of the entrepreneur in case
of success, the maximal ¯nancing horizon, and a stopping rule.
² T
ij
k is the optimal ¯nancing horizon for regime (i=j) under the terms of con-
tract C
ij
k . In the model the optimal ¯nancing horizon will be endogenously
determined to maximize a pro¯t of the venture capitalist.
² V
ij






t;k are the value functions of the leader and the follower at time
t in regime (1=0), for a contract C
ij
k . In regime (1=1) the value function is
denoted E11
t;k.
4Innovation process in this game can be interpreted as following. Each entrepreneur owns a
coin (representing a project). He tosses the coin and counts a number of \heads" (successes)
and \tails" (failures). The ¯rst entrepreneur who counts N heads wins the prize R. In order
to make one toss, each entrepreneur has to pay a prescribed amount of money c. The venture
capitalist provides money for both entrepreneurs in exchange for a share of the prize R.
7² sL
t;k and sF
t;k are the rewards, which the leader, respectively the follower, earn
upon successful completion of the current stage at time t in regime (1=0)
according to the terms of a contract C10
k . In regime (1=1) the reward is
denoted as s11
t;k.
Further, we will call regime (i) a situation, in which the venture capitalist
¯nances only one entrepreneur, who is on i-th stage of R&D. The corresponding
value of the project, value function of an entrepreneur and his reward and maximal
¯nancing horizon are denoted as V i
t , Ei
t, si
t and T i respectively.
Following Bergemann and Hege (2002) and Neher (1999), we assume that the
venture capitalist can commit to ¯nancing the entrepreneurs for a maximum of T
periods.5 If this horizon was reached but no success had been achieved, the project
would be irrevocably abandoned. We discuss this assumption in more detail in
Section 6.
2.3 Moral hazard and contracting
We assume that there is a competitive market for innovative projects and a limited
supply of venture capital. The venture capitalist can choose any entrepreneur from
the pool of identical entrepreneurs. Therefore, in this world the venture capitalist
has all the bargaining power, which also means that after paying an entrepreneur
the incentive compatible compensation, he retains the residual payo® from the
project.
The allocation of funds in this model is subject to moral hazard: in each
period the entrepreneurs face a choice between allocating the funds into R&D and
consuming them. The venture capitalist, however, is willing to ¯nance R&D only
if he can ensure that funds are allocated truthfully in each period of time. That
is, the venture capitalist has to suggest such reward to both entrepreneurs, that
they prefer to allocate the funds to R&D, rather than to divert them. Moreover,
as the only veri¯able outcome in each stage of the game is the completion of this
stage, the incentive scheme should reward the entrepreneurs only if a stage was
successfully completed.
There are several counteracting forces which determine size of the incentives
payment. On one hand, by consuming funds the entrepreneurs receive the im-
mediate utility c in each period. They also ensure themselves further ¯nancing,
i.e., potential rent of c in the next period. Therefore, in each period of time the
venture capitalist should promise the entrepreneurs a reward which is at least as
large as the present value of all investments c which the entrepreneurs can con-
sume. On the other hand, by consuming the funds rather than investing them,
5Note, that we use T to denote a choice variable, which is called maximal ¯nancing horizon,
while T
ij
k is the optimal value of T for regime (i=j) and contract k.
8each entrepreneur faces a risk that his rival wins the prize. This limits the option
of each entrepreneur to deviate and to consume the funds. Therefore, competition
might make it cheaper for the venture capitalist to meet the incentive compatibility
constraints of the entrepreneurs.
In this paper we consider a model in which the venture capitalist initially faces
the leader (an entrepreneur who has ¯nished his ¯rst stage) and the follower (an
entrepreneur who is at the initial stage of R&D). Therefore, we are interested in
developing an optimal contract (or contracts) for the regimes (1=0) and (1=1).
In each of the regimes (1=0) and (1=1), the venture capitalist has to suggest a
new contract to the entrepreneurs. He also has to be able to decide whether to
¯nance both of them, one of them or none and for how long. Each time the regime
switches, new terms of a contract come in force. The terms of a contract stay valid
until one of three events happens: (a) the regime changes, (b) at least one of the
entrepreneurs wins, or (c) maximum time allowed for the current regime elapses.
The terms of the contract should de¯ne the reward of each entrepreneur in case
he achieves a success in the current regime. Further, the contract should de¯ne
the maximal allowed time during which the entrepreneurs can invest in R&D in
the current regime and the consequences to each entrepreneur in case the maximal
time has elapsed but the regime has not changed.
A rule which determines when ¯nancing of one or both entrepreneurs should be
abandoned is called a stopping rule. We consider a class of deterministic stoping
rules, which use the only observable parameter of the model, i.e., the number of
successes, to decide which entrepreneur should be ¯nanced and which should be
stopped. For any regime (i=j), where i ¸ j the venture capitalist can choose
the optimal contract (i.e the reward of the entrepreneurs and maximal ¯nancing
horizon) out of the following classes of stopping rules:
² Rule 1: Finance both entrepreneurs until one of them wins or until the
maximum allowed time T ij expires. If neither entrepreneur has success,
abandon ¯nancing of both.
² Rule 2: Finance both entrepreneurs until one of them wins or until the
maximum allowed time T ij expires. If neither entrepreneur has success,
choose the leader in regime (1=0) and a random entrepreneur in regime
(1=1) and ¯nance him until time T 1 expires.
² Rule 3: Finance only one entrepreneur (the leader in regime (1=0) and in
regime (1=1) a randomly chosen entrepreneur) until time T 1 expires.
In regime (1=1) the class of these stopping rules is limited to the three rules,
described above. In regime (1=0), however, there are other stopping rules which the
venture capitalist could use. Note that the above rules favor the leader in a sense
9that the leader always be ¯nanced at least as long as the follower. Potentially, the
venture capitalist could use some stopping rule, which to the contrary favors the
follower. Intuitively such rules should be less attractive for the venture capitalists
than those where the leader is favored. In Appendix A we show, that any stopping
rule which favors the follower indeed generates a smaller expected pro¯t for the
venture capitalist, that some stopping rule, which favors a leader. Hence, a rational
venture capitalist will use no other stopping rules except those above.
3 Competition in the last stage of innovation
race
To analyze the model we use the subgame perfect equilibrium concept. Hence,
we develop a sequentially optimal dynamic contract, which maximizes the pro¯t
of the venture capitalist at each period of time and in each regime of the game.
In this section we consider a situation in which innovation race is taking place
between two entrepreneurs that are at the last stage of research and development
and have the same probability of winning the ¯nal prize.
Solving the game at this stage means ¯nding a contract, which
1. determines the share of each entrepreneur in case of success;
2. determines the maximum time for the research;
3. determines a stopping rule, which will be used if the maximum time elapses
but no discovery is made. The stopping rule therefore dictates whether the
¯nancing of both entrepreneurs will be ¯nished in that case or whether one
of them will continue his experiment further.
In order to ¯nd this universally optimal contract we ¯rst develop an optimal
contract for each of the three stopping rules and then compare the contracts across
the stopping rules.
3.1 Value of the venture in the last stage
The venture capitalist's decision whether to ¯nance one or two entrepreneurs and
the choice of the maximal horizon of R&D depends on the expected pro¯t which
he receives in each case. This pro¯t is the di®erence between the expected value
of the project and the expected compensation of the entrepreneurs.
As our model is formulated in ¯nite time, we can recover the value of the project
recursively. Consider the ¯rst stopping rule, according to which two entrepreneurs
are ¯nanced until one of them wins, but at most for T periods. This rule gives
10rise to a contract which we will denote C11
1 . In period t the expected value of the
project can be written as
V
11






This value is consists of three terms. The last term 2c represents the necessary
investments by the entrepreneurs. With probability 1¡(1¡p)2 = p(2¡p) at least
one of them makes a discovery (yielding the prize R) at period t. With probability
(1 ¡ p)2 neither of the entrepreneurs makes a discovery, so that the value of the




Considering transition to continuous time and solving the resulting di®erential










The expression for the value function consists of two factors. The ¯rst factor
represents the expected payo® from the investment, discounted with a composite
discount rate which combines time discount r and the uncertain arrival of success.
The second factor shows how the value of the project decreases with time of
discovery. The value functions the second and the third stopping rule can be
derived analogically and are presented in Table 5 in Appendix B. They have a
similar interpretation as described above.7
3.2 Incentives of the entrepreneurs in the last stage
In each period of time the entrepreneurs face a choice between diverting the funds
provided by the venture capitalist for private needs and investing them into the
project. In order to motivate entrepreneurs to allocate the funds truthfully into
research and development, the venture capitalist has to promise them a reward
which is at least as large as the stream of rent that an entrepreneur can receive
from diverting the funds.
With our simple form if the R&D process, each entrepreneur has two available
strategies: he can either \work" (that is, allocate funds into the project) or \shirk"
(that is, divert all funds for private uses). He chooses among them based on the re-
ward scheme. For the time being, we make the assumption that the entrepreneurs
do not behave strategically, i.e., each of them believes that the other entrepreneur
always \works", or allocates the funds into the project in each period.8
6For details on the derivation of the value function see Appendix A.
7The derivation of value function resembles Bergemann and Hege (2000).
8We discuss the strategic interaction in Section 5 and we show that it does not change the
results, which we receive with the assumption of no-strategic interaction.
11The venture capitalist should o®er to each entrepreneur such share s11
t that
both of them ¯nd it incentive compatible to invest in each period, rather than
consume funds. Consider the ¯rst stopping rule. According to this rule, ¯nancing
of both entrepreneurs is terminated if no success occurred before time T 11
1 elapses.
In the terminal period the incentive compatibility constraint is
E
11








T ¸ c: (1)
The left-hand side of (1) is the expected utility of an entrepreneur in case he
invests money into the project. If he wins while his rival loses (which occurs with
probability p(1 ¡ p)) the entrepreneur earns his share s11
T . If there is a tie (with
probability p2), he earns his share with probability 1
2. The right-hand side of (1)
represents the utility which the entrepreneur receives if he consumes the funds.
The incentive compatibility requires that the left-hand side (expected payo® from
investing in the project) is at least as large as the right-hand side (payo® from
diverting the funds).
Moving backward in time we obtain the following intertemporal incentive com-
patibility constraint for period t:
E
11



















The left-hand side of (2) the inequality represents the expected utility of an entre-
preneur, if he allocates the funds into the project at period t. The right-hand side
represents the expected payo® of the entrepreneur from diverting funds at period
t. The incentive to divert funds arises from two sources. First, an entrepreneur
enjoys the utility c from consuming the funds rather than investing them. Second,
by consuming the funds he ensures that ¯nancing of the project will continue in
the next period with probability (1 ¡ p). If he invests funds truthfully, however,
the project will receive further ¯nancing with probability (1 ¡ p)2 < (1 ¡ p) and
therefore by investing truthfully the entrepreneur cuts himself o® from the future
stream of rent. If there is only one entrepreneur, as in Bergemann and Hege
(2002), then by diverting funds in period t he guarantees himself that the funding
will continue in period t + 1 with probability 1, unless it is the terminal period.
In case of two entrepreneurs, however, funding of each is stochastic and depends
on the fact that another entrepreneur has not yet reached success. Therefore,
competition softens the incentive compatibility constraint and makes it easier for
the venture capitalist to satisfy it.
The venture capitalist wants to pay each entrepreneur the minimal share which
will force the entrepreneur to invest the funds rather than consume them. To
determine the sequence of shares in each time t = 1;2;:::;T ¡ 1, the venture
12capitalist has to solve the following minimization problem:
E11
t;1 = minfs11

































Hence in optimum, the constraint is binding. Again, considering the transition
to continuous time we derive expressions for the share, which the entrepreneur
receives in case of success, and the value function which describes the expected



















As the entrepreneurs are identical, in the sense that they are at the same stage of
R&D and have the same probability to complete the project, the value functions
(and the shares) are identical for both entrepreneurs.
The compensation scheme, described by the value function E11
t;1, guarantees
that each entrepreneur uses the funds truthfully in each period in regime (1=1).
The above expression is very intuitive. The ¯rst factor of E11
t;1 represents the value
of perpetuity which an entrepreneur would receive if he diverted the funds. The
second factor represents a \punishment" for late discovery: the share of an entre-
preneur decreases over time. The details about the derivation of value function
E11
t;1 can be found in Appendix A. Analogously it is possible to derive the share
and compensation of the entrepreneurs for other stopping rules. The results are
presented in Table 5 in Appendix B.
3.3 Optimal stopping time
For each stopping rule the venture capitalist maximizes his pro¯t from the project,
given that the incentive compatibility constraints of both entrepreneurs are satis-
¯ed. The choice variables of the venture capitalist are the shares of entrepreneurs
and the time horizon.
Consider the ¯rst stopping rule, which requires that both entrepreneurs are
¯nanced until one of them wins or until the ¯nancing horizon elapses. In the
previous section, we derived the value functions V 11
t;1 and E11
t;1. The optimal time
9See Appendix A for derivation of value function and share of an entrepreneur.








The ¯rst order condition yields a unique solution to the maximization problem.












1 the corresponding contract: Finance both entrepreneurs for T 11
1
periods and abandon both is no success is made (see Table 5 in Appendix B for
other details).
For the benchmark case with one entrepreneur, which corresponds to the third
stopping rule, the optimal ¯nancing horizon is T 1 = ¡1
p ln c
Rp¡c (see also Berge-
mann and Hege 2002). The resulting contract is denoted C4. Since the optimal
¯nancing horizon depends on costs of R&D and on expected payo®, it is not sur-
prising, that T 1 = T 11
1 . Indeed, two entrepreneurs spend twice as much on R&D,
but they also have twice as large probability of success,10 so that the ratio of R&D
costs to the expected payo® remains constant.
Note that for T 1 to be positive it is necessary that Rp > 2c. The intuition
behind this restriction becomes clear when we re-write inequality as R > 2c
p .
Since the R&D in our model follows a Poisson process with parameter p, the
expected time of discovery when a single entrepreneur is employed, is 1
p. Hence,
the requirement R > 2c
p means that the venture capitalist will ¯nance the project
only if the value of the prize is larger than the expected cost of R&D. Otherwise,
it is not pro¯table for the venture capitalist to ¯nance the project at all. From
now on we will assume, that Rp > 2c.
Let us now consider second stopping rule. According to this rule both entre-
preneurs will be ¯nanced until one of them wins, or until the maximal allowed
time elapses. If no success was made, then one entrepreneur will be randomly
chosen and ¯nanced for additional period of time. For simplicity we denote the





0;2 can be found in Table 5 in Appendix B. Maximizing the
pro¯t of the venture capitalist, we obtain the following ¯rst-order condition:
F 0(T) = ¡(r + 2p) ¢ B11 ¢ e¡(r+2p)T + (r + p) ¢ A11 ¢ e¡(r+p)T = 0;











10Intuition for this result is explained in Section 3.4.
14Depending on the relation of A11 and B11 the optimal time can be ¯nite or












which obviously holds for all values of parameters p;r 2 (0;1) satisfying the fea-
sibility condition Rp > 2c.
If (r+p)A11 · (r+2p)B11 < 0, then the expected pro¯t F(T) is decreasing in
T and the optimal research horizon is zero.11 This situation if from the viewpoint
of the venture capitalist equivalent to contract C4.

















The corresponding contract is denoted C11
2 . According this contract, the venture
capitalist commits to ¯nance both entrepreneurs at most for T 11
2 periods; if this
time elapses without a success, then only one entrepreneur (randomly chosen)
will be ¯nanced further. The terms of the contract are described in Table 5 in
Appendix B.
On the other hand, if A11 ¸ 0, the expected pro¯t F(T) is increasing in T
and the optimal research horizon is in¯nite i.e., the venture capitalist is willing to
¯nance the innovation race in¯nitely long. The corresponding contract is denoted
C11
3 . This case corresponds to the favorable combinations of low costs of R&D
and high probability of success. The condition A11 ¸ 0 directly implies that (in
expected terms) the venture capitalist would have to pay higher compensation
to one entrepreneur than to two entrepreneurs, i.e., E1
0 > 2c
r+p. If this is the
case, the venture capitalist always prefers a competitive arrangement to a single
entrepreneur.
Remark 1. Note that for all contracts, the value functions and the cost functions
at the optimal time are homogeneous of degree 1 in (c;R) and homogeneous of
degree 0 in (c;p;r). Therefore, if we denote W(c;p;r;R) the maximal value of the
venture capitalist's objective function,12 then














where ¹ r is some particular value of the discount rate. Hence any comparison of
contracts for general values of parameters c;p;r, and R is equivalent to comparison
11Note that F00 < 0 and F(0) > 0.
12This is, for example, V 11
0;1 ¡ 2E11
0;1 at time T = T11
1 for contract C11
1 .
15for parameters c and p with an arbitrary value of r and with R = 1.13 Later, we
use, without loss of generality, the value ¹ r = 0:05 in numerical simulations.
3.4 The e®ect of competition
For each of the three stopping rules we can now specify a contract in terms of
maximum time allowed for research and share of the prize, which each entrepreneur
receives in case of success. As we showed in the previous section, some stopping
rules generate more than one optimal contract. In any case, the terms of the
contracts depend on the probability of success and the normalized costs (that is
on the ratio c
R; see Remark 1). For each combination of parameters, the venture
capitalist will choose among three contracts, corresponding to three stopping rules.
The optimal contract then is the one which maximizes the residual payo® of the
venture capitalist.
Proposition 1. Let Rp > 2c. Then, in regime (1=1) the optimal contract is




abandon ¯nancing of both if no success was made (such contract is denoted C11
1 ).
The proof of the proposition can be found in Appendix A. In order to under-
stand the above result, recall that the R&D is modelled as a Poisson process. In
each time the probability that at least one entrepreneur succeeds is 1¡(1¡p2) =
2p¡p2. According to the de¯nition of the Poisson process, in continuous time the
probability that two events (two successes) will occur in time interval [t;t + ¢]
interval converges to zero, as ¢ ! 0. Therefore, the probability that at least
one entrepreneur encounters a success in [t;t+¢] can be approximated by 2¢p.14
Thus, at each time two entrepreneurs create twice as much value as one entrepre-
neur. At the same time, the expected reward to be paid to each of the competing













Let us summarize the e®ects which competition has for the R&D process and
pro¯ts of the venture capitalist. When identical entrepreneurs are at the last stage
of R&D, competition is unambiguously a bene¯cial arrangement from the point
of view of the venture capitalist. It reduces the rent which each entrepreneur
can extract from the venture capitalist: it \disciplines" the entrepreneurs, making
13In particular, given c;p;r, and R, we choose an arbitrary ¹ r > 0 and consider new variables
¹ c = ¹ rc
Rr and ¹ p =
¹ rp
r , which gives W(c;p;r;R) = R ¢ W(¹ c; ¹ p; ¹ r;1). We rename the variables to c
and p by dropping the bar.
14This means, 2¢p is the ¯rst-order approximation of the probability. More precisely, the
probability can be written as 2¢p + o(¢).
16them work hard for less. The surplus of the venture capitalist is always larger under
the arrangement with two competing entrepreneurs. The model predicts therefore,
that the venture capitalist will always choose to ¯nance competing entrepreneurs,
if they are at the same (the last) stage of innovation race. This strong conclusion
is partially a result of the assumption that the entrepreneurs are considered to be
identical, which is a simpli¯cation of reality. In the next section show that this
conclusion may not hold for entrepreneurs on the di®erent stages of R&D, which
is most likely the case that venture capitalists and similar institutions face.
4 Competition between leader and follower
When an innovation race starts in a regime with a leader and a follower, the
entrepreneurs are not identical from the venture capitalist's point of view. Indeed,
the leader has a higher probability of winning a prize. In this section we investi-
gate whether and when the venture capitalist is willing to ¯nance two competing
entrepreneurs which are at di®erent stages of R&D. Intuitively, competition can
be bene¯cial, if the presence of the follower considerably limits the rent which the
leader can extract from the venture capitalist. The follower has to be a credible
threat in the sense that the probability that he makes a breakthrough and wins
the race should be su±ciently high. On the other hand, the costs of R&D should
be low, compared to the expected prize, so that the duplication of research e®orts
is justi¯ed.
In a game where two stages need to be completed, the leader is an entrepreneur
who has ¯nished the ¯rst stage of R&D (has already encountered one success),
while the follower is his rival, who has still needs two successes, i.e., has zero suc-
cesses. In our notations, this situation corresponds to regime (1=0). Analogically
to regime (1=1) we investigate contracts, corresponding to three stopping rules.
The contracts relevant for regime (1=0) are described in Table 6. As in regime
(1=1), all value functions and cost functions are homogeneous of degree 1 in (c;R)
and of degree 0 in (c;p;r).
An important observation is that the reward of the leader has to be higher than
the reward of the follower. By diverting funds at some period of time, the leader






1+r is his expected payo® in the case
when the follower makes the ¯rst success.15 Therefore, the venture capitalist has
to o®er the leader an incentive compatible share, such that the leader's expected
reward will be at least as large as the stream of rents (c +
pE11
0
1+r ). On the other
hand, if the follower consumes funds in period t, he can only guarantee himself a
15In regime (1=1) the optimal contract is C11
1 . Henceforth, for ease of notation when referring to
the terms of this contract we will relax the index of a contract. That is E11
t := E11
t;1, V 11




17rent of c in this period. Therefore, his incentive compatible share should be lower
than that of the leader.
For each stopping rule the value functions and optimal ¯nancing horizons are
derived recursively from the terminal condition. In particular, the second stopping
rule gives a raise to more than one contract, which di®er with respect to optimal
¯nancing horizon. In this case the value of the venture and expected reward of
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with respect to stopping time T we obtain the following ¯rst order condition:
G
0(T) = ¡(r + 2p)B
10 ¢ e















p(R + V 11
0 ) ¡ 2c
r + 2p
: (7)
Depending on the relation of A10 and B10, the optimal ¯nancing horizon can
be either zero, positive ¯nite, or in¯nite. The following lemma summarizes the
results; see Appendix A for its proof.
Lemma 1. Let Rp > 2c. Then in regime (1=0) the following statements hold:
1. If A10 > 0, then B10 < 0. In that case G(T) in monotonically increasing
and the optimal stoping time is in¯nite (contract C10
3 ).






















2 > 0. The corresponding contract is denoted C10
2 .
3. If A10 < 0 and (r+p)A10 < (r+2p)B10, then function G(T) is monotonically
increasing and the optimal stoping time is zero.
18Note that in case 3. the venture capitalist ¯nances a single entrepreneur, i.e.,
V 10




0. In other words, if the pro¯t of the venture capitalist
in the case when he ¯nances both the leader and the follower is a monotonically
decreasing function of time, he will prefer to ¯nance the leader alone (contract
C4). In case 2. the venture capitalist ¯nances both entrepreneurs until time T 10
2
is reached and then abandon the follower and continue ¯nancing the leader for
additional T 1 = ¡1
p ln c
Rp¡c periods. See Table 2 in Appendix B for further details
on the contracts.
If the ¯rst stopping rule is applied, then the optimal stopping time is ¯nite and
the corresponding share of the entrepreneurs and value functions are described
with contract C10
1 . According to this contract both entrepreneurs will be ¯nanced






0 )¡2c is reached or until the
regime changes. Note that 2c + pE11
0 < p(R + V 11
0 ) ¡ 2c is necessary for T 10
1 to
be positive. If the reverse inequality holds, then the optimal stopping time is zero
and contract C10
1 degenerates to contract C4.
There are conditions on parameters (p; c
R) that determine, whether a particular
contract can be applied. For the contracts with ¯nite stopping time (i.e., contracts
C10
1 , C10
2 , C4), these conditions require, that the optimal ¯nancing horizon is
positive. For contract C10
3 , these conditions require, that parameters are such,
that the optimal ¯nancing horizon is in¯nite. From now on we will call these
condition the feasibility conditions. We will call a contract feasible in the range
of parameters, where the corresponding feasibility conditions are satis¯ed. The
range of parameters, where feasibility conditions for each contract are satis¯ed, is
shown in Figure 3 in Appendix B.
Out of the pool of feasible contracts we then choose the one, which maximizes
the pro¯t of venture capitalist, i.e., we look for an optimal contract with respect to
stopping rules. Investigation of feasibility conditions and optimality of contracts
leads to Proposition 2. The proof of the proposition (partly numerical) can be
found in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. Let Rp > 2c. Then in regime (1=0) the following statements hold:
1. If A10 > 0, then the feasible contracts are C10
1 , C10
3 and C4. The optimal
contract out of these contracts is C10
1 .
2. If 0 > A10(r + p) > B10(r + 2p), then the feasible contracts are C10
1 , C10
2
and C4. The optimal contract is C10









0 . Otherwise, contract C10
2 is optimal.
3. If A10(r + p) < B10(r + 2p) and (2c + E11
0 ) < p(R + V 11
0 ) ¡ 2c, then the
feasible contracts are C10
1 and C4. The optimal contract is C4.
194. If A10(r +p) < B10(r +2p) and (2c+E11
0 ) > p(R+V 11
0 )¡2c, then the only
feasible (hence, the optimal) contract is C4.
Let us denote Ri the domain of parameters (p;c) where contract C10
i is optimal,
where i = 1;2;3;4.16 Proposition 2 shows that the domain R3 is empty and hence
the whole parameter space can be divided into three domains R1, R2, and R4, as
shown in Figure 1.17












Figure 1: Regime (1/0): Division of the parameter space into three domains
according to optimal contracts; for r = 0:05
As Figure 1 shows, the region R1 corresponds to the most favorable combina-
tion of costs of R&D and the probability of success. In region R4, on the contrary,
for each success probability the costs of research and development are the highest.
Finally, in region R2 the combination of costs and success probability is moderately
favorable. It is therefore intuitive that competition is a bene¯cial arrangement for
the venture capitalist, if values of the parameters lie in the domain R1 or R2, while
in domain R4, competition is not bene¯cial, since the costs are too high to justify
the duplication of research e®orts.
16Region R4 corresponds to contract C4.
17To draw the domains R1, R2, and R4 we considered ¯xed values of discount rate r = 0:05
and prize R = 1 and used numerical simulations. On a grid 0:001 £ 0:001 and for values of
parameters, such that p 2 [0;1] and c 2 [0;p=2] we plotted the points where the constraints for
each domain are satis¯ed. The results do not di®er qualitatively for other values of discount
rates. Moreover, again we can ¯x values of R and r and all statements remain true. See Proof
of Proposition 2 for details.
204.1 The optimal contract in the absence of moral hazard
In order to investigate the e®ect that competition has on the decision to employ
competing entrepreneurs, we compare the moral hazard setting with the bench-
mark case without moral hazard. In the latter case the venture capitalist can
perfectly observe the allocation of funds and therefore the reservation utility of
both entrepreneurs is zero (this is due to the assumption that the venture capital-
ist has all bargaining power). Hence, the expected payo® of the venture capitalist
equals the expected value of the project. For all stopping rules the value of the
project is maximized, if the time of ¯nancing is in¯nity.
In the regime (1=1), values of the project when competing entrepreneurs are











Obviously, V 11 > V 1, so that the venture capitalist will always choose to ¯nance
competing entrepreneurs, if both are on the last stage of R&D. Note, that the
necessary condition for a project to be ¯nanced in no moral hazard setting is
Rp > c, as opposed to Rp > 2c in the no moral hazard setting.




p(R + V 11) ¡ 2c
r + 2p
:






(r + 2p)(r + p)
: (8)
Otherwise, the venture capitalist will ¯nance both entrepreneurs.
The division of the parameter space into two domains is shown in Figure 2.
The border curve between single entrepreneur (SE) and competing entrepreneurs
(CE) area satis¯es condition c
Rp¡c =
p¢r
(r+2p)(r+p).18 The region above the line
represents combinations of costs and success probability, where (8) holds, i.e.,
where the venture capitalist ¯nances only the leader. If the combination of costs
and probability is below the line, then the venture capitalist will prefer to ¯nance
both entrepreneurs.
18The areas were plotted for r is ¯xed at r = 0:05. The results does not change qualitatively
for other reasonable discount rates.











Figure 2: Regime (1/0), no-moral hazard case: Competing entrepreneurs (CE) vs
a single entrepreneur (SE); r = 0:05
4.2 The e®ect of competition
In regime (1=1) the venture capitalist prefers to employ competing entrepreneurs,
regardless whether the moral hazard is present or not. Without moral hazard this
decision is motivated by the \scale" e®ect: with two entrepreneurs the probability
of success is twice as large as with one entrepreneur. With moral hazard there is
additional e®ect of competition, which we call the \disciplining" e®ect. This e®ect
decreases the rent of each entrepreneur comparing to situation of no competition,
so that in case of success the venture capitalist retains larger share of the prize.
Analysis of regime with the leader and the follower allows to understand the
relative importance of the \scale" and \disciplining" e®ect in the presence of moral
hazard. A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that without moral hazard the
range of parameters where the competition is bene¯cial is signi¯cantly smaller
than in a moral hazard setting. In the absence of moral hazard the increased
probability of success due to competition (\scale" e®ect) is most of the time not
su±cient to justify ¯nancing of both the leader and the follower. However, the
disciplining e®ect of competition in case of moral hazard is so important, that
the venture capitalist will hire both the leader and the follower, although he does
not gain much in terms of success probability. The venture capitalist nevertheless
gains from the reduction of rent which he has to pay to both entrepreneurs. For
certain combinations of costs and probability, the decrease in compensation of
the leader due to competition is large enough to justify the ¯nancing of both
entrepreneurs (domains R1 and R2). Naturally, the competition can be justi¯ed
only if the follower is not too expensive to ¯nance (c should be relatively small)
and the reduction in the rent of the leader due to competition is signi¯cant (p
22should be relatively large).
Another result of competition between entrepreneurs is increase in the total
¯nancing horizon of the project. For range of costs and probabilities where the
venture capitalist chooses to ¯nance both the leader and the follower (i.e., domains
R1 and R2), the maximal ¯nancing horizon is longer with a competitive arrange-
ment than with a single entrepreneur. Indeed, a single entrepreneur (the leader)
would be ¯nanced for at most of T 1 periods according to contract C4. If both entre-
preneurs are employed, then the maximum ¯nancing horizon is T 10
k + T 1 > T 1,
where k = 1;2. Therefore, competition helps to alleviate one of the main prob-
lems created by moral hazard | the limitation of the research horizon. We have
shown that the ¯rst best solution obtained in the absence of moral hazard is to
¯nance the project in¯nitely long. The same result was obtained for the case of
one entrepreneur by Bergemann and Hege (2002). Since the value of the project
increases in the research horizon, the presence of moral hazard reduces this value.
Competition, however, limits the amount of rent which the entrepreneurs can ex-
tract from the venture capitalist and hence allows the venture capitalist to set a
longer ¯nancing horizon.
We conclude our analysis of regime (1=0) by noticing that the area R4 is larger
than the area R2 [ R1.19 Therefore, the model predicts that when the venture
capitalist faces two entrepreneurs at di®erent stages of R&D, he will more often
employ only one of them (the leader), rather than both.20 The venture capitalist
will only ¯nance the leader and the follower if the latter can be a credible threat to
the former and if the costs of research and development are small enough compared
to the expected payo®.
This prediction suggests an explanation why do venture capitalists not ¯nance
R&D race frequently. The venture capitalist-like institutions usually face projects
(the entrepreneurs) which are at di®erent stages of R&D and therefore tend to
choose the more advanced of them. A di®erent position in innovation race is an
example of asymmetries between entrepreneurs. Our results indicate that the ven-
ture capitalist is less willing to ¯nance a race between asymmetric entrepreneurs
than between identical ones. Indeed, we have shown earlier that when entrepre-
neurs are identical, i.e., they are at the same stage of R&D, the venture capitalist
will ¯nance both.
In practice, the venture capitalist can face projects which are identical in terms
of number of completed stages, if these are projects at the initial stage of R&D.
Examples would be a revolutionary drug for which no prototypes exist, or software
solutions based on an entirely new concept. In terms of our model, this situation
would correspond to regime (0=0). However, investigation of this regime is beyond
19For r = 0:05 it is visible from Figure 1. The results are similar also for other values of r.
20This is true when all combinations of parameters are equally probable.
23the scope of the present paper.
5 Strategic interaction
Up to this point we assumed that the entrepreneurs do not think strategically,
i.e., that each entrepreneur believes that his rival always invests all funds into
R&D. In other words, each entrepreneur believes that by diverting the funds in
each period, he faces a probability p that his rival wins the prize in the mean-
time. With this assumption in hand, we have shown that competition softens the
incentive compatibility constraints of the entrepreneurs and makes it cheaper for
the venture capitalist to provide an incentive compatible reward scheme. As we
have discussed, the incentive compatible reward of each entrepreneur is lower in
the case of competition, than in the case of no competition.
However, if the entrepreneurs are well-trained game theorists and think strate-
gically, they will take into account all possible strategies of the rival. Those can
be either \work" (denote it w) or \shirk" (denote it s). Hence, in each period
we can model the behavior of the entrepreneurs by a 2 £ 2 game. The venture
capitalist, naturally, wants to ensure the (w;w) equilibrium. Otherwise his invest-
ments are wasted. In this section we will show that in order to ensure the unique
equilibrium (w;w) and rule out the equilibrium (s;s), it is su±cient to provide
the entrepreneurs with a reward, which is incentive compatible under the (w;w)
scheme, as considered before.
5.1 Strategic interaction in regime (1=1)
We start with the last stage of the game, i.e., regime (1=1). Consider the terminal
period T 11 =: T. Let sT be the reward of an entrepreneur if he achieves a success.
The payo® matrix of the game between two competing entrepreneurs is given in
Table 1.
In order to ensure that (w;w) is a unique Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies),
the reward sT should be such that: w 2 BR(w) and w 2 BR(s), where BR stands
for best response. Examining the payo®s, we can show that:









T for all p 2 (0;1), in the terminal period of the game the venture
capitalist can ensure the unique equilibrium (w;w) by promising the entrepreneurs
reward sT = sw
T.
Consider now some period of time t · T ¡ 1 and assume that both entrepre-
neurs invest truthfully in each period ¿ = t + 1;:::;T. We will determine such
24w s






Table 1: Normal form of the game: regime (1=1), t = T
st that in period t both entrepreneurs ¯nd it incentive compatible to invest funds
rather than divert them. Table 2 shows a payo® matrix for period t.
w s






























Table 2: Payo® matrix for competition with strategic interaction in regime (1=1)
Here E11
t = c
r+p(1 ¡ e¡(T¡t)(r+p)) is the value of the expected reward of an
entrepreneur, given that both entrepreneurs invest from time t on. As before, we
need to determine st such that for each entrepreneur w is a best response to any
strategy of a rival:












In order to ensure the unique equilibrium (w;w), the venture capitalist has to
25promise the entrepreneurs a share st ¸ maxfss
t;sw



















r+p < c. There-
fore, by promising the entrepreneurs a reward st = sw
t the venture capitalist en-
sures the equilibrium (w;w). Note that this reward is exactly the reward which
we have calculated before, without accounting for strategic interaction.22
The result which we have established holds for any t · T ¡ 1, therefore it
holds in particular for t = T ¡ 1. We have proved that in the terminal period the
entrepreneurs will invest, if rewarded according to the (w;w) scheme. Therefore,
they will also invest in period (T ¡1) if rewarded according to the (w;w) scheme.
Recursively, we can prove that the result holds for any period t of regime (1=1).
It is interesting to observe that if the entrepreneurs are compensated accord-
ing to the (w;w) scheme, then in regime (1=1) at each period of time the game
resembles the Prisoners Dilemma game. The entrepreneurs can be better o® if
they divert the funds simultaneously in all periods. Indeed, in this case the
expected payo® of each entrepreneur is c
r(1 ¡ e¡rT), i.e., a properly discounted
stream of rent c. If both entrepreneurs invest, then the expected reward of each is
c
r+p(1¡e¡(r+p)T) < c
r(1¡e¡rT). But under the incentive scheme (w;w), \work" is
always the best response to \shirk", therefore, a potentially attractive (for entre-
preneurs) situation (s;s) is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
5.2 Strategic interaction in regime (1=0)
We continue our analysis by considering the regime (1=0). If parameters belong
to domain R4, then the venture capitalist will ¯nance only the most advanced
entrepreneur (the leader). Therefore, we need to analyze the strategic interaction
only in domains R1 and R2.
To prove that incentive scheme (sL
t;k;sF
t;k) induces a unique equilibrium (w;w)
it is enough to show that for the follower \work" is always a best response, if
he is compensated according to (w;w) scheme. We make our point clear below,
analyzing ¯rst the domain R1 and then domain R2.
Table 3 represents the payo® matrix for the terminal period of the game in the
regime (1=0) of domain R1. The ¯rst payo® is the payo® of the leader (row player)
and the second payo® is the payo® of the follower (column player). For simplicity
21We will assume that when the entrepreneurs are indi®erent between strategies \work" and
\shirk", they choose to work.


































Table 3: Normal form of the game in regime (1=0): domain R1, t = T:
Investigating the payo® of the follower, we derive the following conditions:
















It is obvious, that s
F;w
T is always larger than s
F;s
T . Therefore, if the venture
capitalist promises a reward sF
T = s
F;w
T to the follower, he ensures that the latter
invests truthfully irrespective of the leader's strategy. This implies, that the leader




















fore, if in the last period of time both entrepreneurs are compensated according
to (w;w) scheme, there is a unique equilibrium (w;w).
Going backwards in time, we can prove that \work" is the follower's dominant
strategy if he is compensated according to (w;w) scheme. The payo® matrix in
Table 4 shows payo®s of the follower (column player) in four strategic situations.
In the payo® matrix, EF
t+1;1 is the expected payo® of the follower in period
t + 1, giving that both the leader and the follower invest in each period starting
from the period t + 1. Investigating the payo®s, we establish the condition for
\work" to be a best response for the follower.









































Table 4: Payo®s of the follower in regime (1=0), domain R1.
Note that s
F;w
t is greater than s
F;s
t . Thus, to ensure that the follower invests in
period t, the venture capitalist has to promise him a reward of sF
t = s
F;w
t , which is
exactly the reward which he would pay under terms of contract C10
1 . Giving, that
the follower works (i.e., invests) in each period of time, the venture capitalist has
to promise a reward to the leader, such that the latter ¯nds it incentive compatible
to invest as well. This reward is exactly the reward of the leader, established by
the terms of contract C10
1 . Hence, the presence of strategic interaction does not
change results of the analysis of regime (1=0).
Finally, the analysis for domain R2 closely resembles the analysis for domain
R1. The expected reward of the follower in any period of time is the same, as
in domain R1 up to the length of ¯nancing horizon. The length of the ¯nancing
horizon however, does not in°uence the analysis of strategic interaction. Therefore,
in domain R2 the follower's dominant strategy is \work", if and only if he is






1+r . Given that the follower invests in
period t, the leader will invest if he is rewarded under (w;w) scheme. The incentive
compatible shares and value function of the leader and the follower are described
in contract C10
2 .
6 Finite horizon and commitment to stop
So far, we have assumed that the venture capitalist can choose the ¯nancing hori-
zon for each regime and can commit to it. This means that if the maximum time
allowed for experimentation in regime (i=j) elapses without success, then depend-
ing on terms of the contract either the project will be irrevocably abandoned, or
the venture capitalist will abandon ¯nancing of follower. In this section we provide
a rationale for that assumption.
If we assume that the venture capitalist cannot commit to stop the project
after the maximal allowed time has elapsed, then he will ¯nance the entrepreneurs
in¯nitely long. Suppose that in regime (i=j) the contract between the venture
28capitalist and entrepreneurs determines some (optimal) time T ij. If this time
elapses but no success was made by any entrepreneur, the venture capitalist is
willing to start the game from the beginning, as if the world is in the ¯rst period
of regime (i=j). Indeed, all costs that the venture capitalists has incurred up to
time T ij are sunk, and the game has not changed since the venture capitalist made
his optimal decision at t = 0 of regime (i=j). Because of this feature of our model
(sunk costs and independent probability of success in each period), the venture
capitalist is willing to ¯nance the entrepreneurs in¯nitely long, if he enters the
game once.
If the venture capitalist cannot commit to stopping the project, he also is
not able to condition further ¯nancing on successful completion of predetermined
stages or benchmarks. In a world, where commitment is not credible, the venture
capitalists (if he decides to enter the game) will ¯nance entrepreneurs until one of
them wins the prize.
However, empirical literature on venture capital documents, that stage ¯nan-
cing, which is conditional on successful completion of prescribed milestones, is one
of the most important and commonly used control mechanisms in venture capital
¯nancing.23 Therefore, the commitment assumption is not only realistic, but is
essential for the ability of the venture capitalist to include the provision about the
milestones into the contract.
Obviously, in our model the venture capitalist prefers committing to ¯nite ¯-
nancing horizon. Commitment to stop ¯nancing of the project is an important
punishment mechanisms, which allows to decrease compensation of the entrepre-
neurs and therefore to increase pro¯ts of the venture capitalist, comparing to
situation with no commitment. In the model, however, there is no endogenous
mechanism, which would make the ex-ante commitment credible ex-post. Hence,
to justify the commitment power of the venture capitalist in our model, we make
an assumption, that the venture capitalist is wealth-constrained.
This realistic assumption is well supported by the evidence about practice of
the venture-capital funds. According to Inderst and Munnich (2003), the ven-
ture capital funds are normally close-ended, which means that funds are raised
once from the investors and are directed afterwards into the portfolio of projects.
The partnership agreements, which govern the venture capital funds, often con-
tain a covenant that limits a possibility of the venture capitalist to raise further
investments. Likewise, the partnership agreements restrict ability of the venture
capitalist to transfer investments across projects and across di®erent funds, run by
the same partners. The wealth-constrained venture capitalist can credibly commit
to limit resources directed to each of his portfolio projects and hence can commit
to the ¯nite ¯nancing horizon.
23See, for example, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) and Sahlman (1990).
29In the world described in our model, this commitment can be understood as
the following. Ex ante, the venture capitalist is able to calculate the optimal
period of time, during which he is willing to ¯nance the project. He then commits
a corresponding amount of money for this project and commits all other resources
to his other portfolio projects. The partnership agreements restrict the ability of
the venture capitalist to raise additional funds; therefore the commitment to stop
the project is credible.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we study innovation race in the moral hazard setting. We explore
a model where two entrepreneurs simultaneously develop a project which, if suc-
cessful, generates a prize R. The project is developed in stages and the ¯rst
entrepreneur who completes the second stage wins the prize. Research and devel-
opment is ¯nanced by the venture capitalist, but the funds are allocated by the
entrepreneurs. This creates a moral hazard problem: the entrepreneurs can divert
the funds to their own uses. We investigate two possible states of the game: a
state where one of the entrepreneurs is a leader and another is a follower, and a
state, where both entrepreneurs are at the last stage of R&D.
We identify two e®ects which make the ¯nancing of competing entrepreneurs
bene¯cial for the venture capitalist. First e®ect is the higher probability of success
(scale e®ect) and the second is less obvious e®ect which competition has on incen-
tives (disciplining e®ect). In order to highlight the importance of competition in
the moral hazard setting we compare it with the benchmark setting of no moral
hazard. The analysis reveals, that in the regime where both entrepreneurs are
on the last stage of research both e®ects are important. Due to the scale e®ect
¯nancing of competing entrepreneurs is attractive in the absence of moral hazard.
In the moral hazard setting, the presence of a competitor limits the rent which
each entrepreneurs can extract from the venture capitalist. This disciplining e®ect
reinforces scale e®ect, making the ¯nancing of competing entrepreneurs attractive
also in the moral hazard setting.
However, in the regime with the leader and the follower, the scale e®ect appears
to be of little importance, so that without moral hazard the follower will almost
never be employed. Nevertheless, with moral hazard in place the presence of
a competitor allows to reduce signi¯cantly the rent of the leader, which makes
competition a bene¯cial arrangement for large range of parameters.
The key result of the paper, that competition positively a®ects incentives of
the agents (i.e., relaxes their incentive constraint), is not surprising. This logic
has been applied in various settings, including yardstick competition (Tirole 1997,
pp. 41{42) or design of team incentives (Holmstrom 1982). We contribute to
30the literature by investigating the e®ect of competition on incentives in the dy-
namic framework, where only the winner's output matters to a principal. In this
framework, competition has a positive incentive e®ect even when the research tech-
nologies are independent (which is not the case in yardstick competition). Since
every period each entrepreneur faces a threat that his rival wins the current stage
of research, the existence of a rival \disciplines" entrepreneurs and decreases the
amount of rent which they can extract from the venture capitalist.
Analyzing the model, we derive a solution to the dynamic optimal contract
problem and characterize the expected reward of the entrepreneurs, the expected
value of the project and the expected pro¯t of the venture capitalist in the closed
form. Investigation of optimal contracts yields the following conclusions:
1. Competition disciplines entrepreneurs and makes diversion of funds for pri-
vate use less lucrative then in a set up with one entrepreneur. Hence, it
often allows the venture capitalist to retain larger surplus from the project,
comparing with non-competitive situation.
2. If there is a leader and a follower in the innovation race, then optimal contract
requires, that the leader is ¯nanced at least long as the follower and has
higher expected reward.
3. Competition increases the maximal research horizon during which the ven-
ture capitalist is willing to ¯nance entrepreneurs.
Our key ¯nding therefore is that competition can be used by the venture cap-
italist as an e®ective cure against the moral hazard problem, in situation when
the allocation of funds by the entrepreneurs is not observable. Hence, competition
is a \natural" mechanism which allows to improve the e±ciency of research and
development. The existence of such mechanism is particulary important in those
cases, where the use of complicated security schemes, which are developed in the
venture capital literature, is di±cult or not possible at all.
Our results can also be related to a setup where the entrepreneurs have di®erent
probability of success, in the sense that the same stage of R&D corresponds to
identical probability of success, and a di®erent stage of R&D corresponds to a
asymmetric probability of success. Then our results suggest that as asymmetry
between entrepreneurs increases, the positive e®ect of competition becomes less
pronounced. Moreover, in setting with asymmetric entrepreneurs, the competition
is bene¯cial if the value of output relative to costs is high and there is high chance
that the asymmetry will be eliminated (namely probability of success is relatively
high).
The logic of the model can be extended to the N-staged research process. It
is intuitive, that the higher is the asymmetry between entrepreneurs in terms of
31completed stages, the less bene¯cial is competition between the leader and the
follower. However, calculations becomes incredibly cumbersome, as number of
stages increases. The direction for future research is to modify the model in order
to investigate the competition for N-staged research.
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34A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Derivation of the value of the project in Section 3.1
Consider ¯rst the case where a venture capitalist provides ¯nancing to both entre-
preneurs and abandons both if no success was made at time t · T (¯rst stopping
rule).
At the terminal period, the value of the project is
V
11
T = R(1 ¡ (1 ¡ p)
2) ¡ 2c = 2(Rp ¡ c) ¡ Rp
2: (9)
Going back in time we construct recursively the value of the project at time
t = T ¡ 1;:::;2;1 as
V
11







Following Bergemann and Hege (2000) we consider transition to continuous time:
V
11
t = 2(R¢p ¡ ¢c) ¡ R(¢p)
2 +





where ¢ is a time which elapses between t and t+¢. Dividing the expression by
¢ and taking ¢ ! 0 we receive the following di®erential equation:
V
11
t (r + 2p) = 2(Rp ¡ c) + _ V
11
t :
Solving the di®erential equation with initial (terminal) condition (9) we receive









The derivation of the value function for the case, where the second stopping rule
applies is identical except for the boundary condition, which is
V
11







Here 2(Rp ¡ c) ¡ Rp2 is the value of the project if success was achieved at period
t = T and
1¡p
1+rV 1
0 is the value of the project if the success was not achieved at the
terminal period and one entrepreneur was randomly chosen to continue R&D.
35A.2 Derivation of the value function and the share of an
entrepreneur in Section 3.2
We will derive the value function for regime (1=1), ¯rst stopping rule. All other
value functions which describe the reward of an entrepreneur can be derived ana-
logically.
The minimization program, which allows us to determine the optimal share st
and expected reward E11
t;1 of the entrepreneur is given in Section 3:
E11
t;1 = minfs11



































Since the venture capitalist wants to minimize the payment to each entrepre-
neur, the incentive compatibility constraint is binding. From this constraint we






















Finally, letting ¢ ! 0 we receive the continuous time expression for the share of







If the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, then the solution to the mini-
mization problem can be derived from the equality
E
11










t;1 = c + _ E
11
t;1: (11)
The terminal condition for this di®erential equation is given by the incentive com-
patibility constraint in the terminal period of regime (1=1):
E
11









36Solving the di®erential equation (11) and using the above initial (terminal)











Consider the following stopping rules:
² Rule 4: In regime (1=0) employ both entrepreneurs and ¯nance them at
most for T periods. If the follower succeeds, then continue ¯nancing in
regime (1=1). If the follower fails, then abandon the leader and continue
¯nancing the follower at most for T 0 + T 1 periods.
² Rule 5: In regime (1=0) freeze ¯nancing of the leader and continue ¯nancing
the follower for at most T periods. If the follower succeeds, then continue
¯nancing in regime (1=1). If he fails, then stop both.
² Rule 6: In regime (1=0) freeze ¯nancing of the leader and continue ¯nancing
the follower for at most T periods. If the follower succeeds, then continue
¯nancing in regime (1=1). If he fails, then stop the follower and continue
¯nancing the leader for at most T 1 periods.
² Rule 7: In regime (1=0) freeze ¯nancing of the leader and continue ¯nancing
the follower for at most T periods. If the follower succeeds, then continue
¯nancing in regime (1=1). If he fails, then continue ¯nancing both in regime
(1=0).
We will show that each of the above stopping rule delivers the venture cap-
italist lower pro¯t, than one of the stopping rules 1 to 3. For the purpose of
further discussion we simplify the notation and will denote optimal stopping time,
corresponding to particular stopping rule by Ti, where i = 1;:::;7.
Consider Rule 4. Its counterpart is Rule 2, according to which if no success
was made the venture capitalist will abandon the follower and will ¯nance only the
leader. The latter case obviously generates larger pro¯t to the venture capitalist,
because after the follower is abandoned, there is only one stage to complete. How-
ever, if the leader is abandoned, two stages must be completed in order to reach
a success. Formally, the pro¯t of the venture capitalist if the second stopping rule
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37If the forth stopping rule is applied, than the di®erence with the case above is
that the follower needs stronger incentives than in the former case and the leader
needs the softer incentives. On the other hand, the value of the project will be






p(R + V 11












0 < V 1
0 ¡E1
0 (the venture capitalist is always better o® by employing
the leader than the follower), it is clear that V0;4 ¡EL
0;4 ¡EF




for any ¯nancing horizon T.
Rule 5 is clearly worse than Rule 6, which requires that when no change of the
regime occurred, the follower will be abandoned and the leader will be ¯nanced
further. Indeed, the constraint Rp > 2c ensures that in regime (1=0) is always
optimal to employ at least the leader. Moreover, the incentives of the follower
under Rule 5 are the same as under Rule 6, since he will be ¯nanced beyond
regime (1=0) only if he completes his ¯rst stage. Hence, Rule 6 does not change
the incentive of the follower and allows to reach higher value of the project than
the Rule 5.
On the other hand, Rule 6 is intuitively worse then the Rule 3. Indeed, ac-
cording to the former rule, the venture capitalist ¯nances a follower in a hope
that he completes one (the ¯rst) stage. The venture capitalist, however, could
as well ¯nance the leader so that he completes his last stage and wins a prize.
The latter case is obviously of a greater value to the venture capitalist. To prove
this argument formally, we compare the surplus of the venture capitalist, which






























































If the function decreases in T, then the result is immediate: the venture capitalist
will optimally set T = 0 and will prefer to employ the leader alone. If, on the






































surplus of the venture capitalist under Rule 6 with the surplus which he retains if































Taking the feasibility constraints into account, we observe, that the left-hand side



























Finally, the Rule 7 is an obvious counterpart of the Rule 1 or Rule 2, with the
modi¯cation that it has an additional stage where only follower alone is ¯nanced,
while the ¯nancing of the leader is frozen. After that, if the the follower did
not succeed, both entrepreneurs will be ¯nanced either according to contract C10
1
or according to contract C10
2 (depending on parameters range, see Table 6 for
feasibility constrains). Intuitively, the Rule 7 generates lower pro¯t for the venture
capitalist, than any of this contracts, because by freezing the ¯nancing of the leader
he postpones the event of ¯nal success. The formal proof is analogical to the case
of Rule 6 and is therefore not presented here.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is divided into two parts depending on the sign of A11. If the parameters
are such that A11 > 0, then the feasible contracts are C11
1 , C11
3 and C4. On the
other hand, if A11 · 0, then the available contracts are C11
1 , C11
2 and C4. We will
show that in both cases contract C11
1 is optimal.
First we show that contract C11
1 is always (regardless of A11) preferred to
contract C4. Translated into pro¯ts, this is equivalent to the inequality V 11
0;1 ¡
392E11
0;1 > V 1
0 ¡E1
0, with V 11
0;1, E11
0;1, V 1
0 , and E1
0 given in Table 5. After substitution,
























Note that the optimal time is the same for both contracts and is equal to T =
T 1 = T 11
1 = ¡1
p ln c
Rp¡c. Therefore, e¡pT = c





or equivalently c = Rp x



























Note that e¡pT = x and the assumption Rp > 2c > 0 implies that x 2 (0;1).
Multiplying the last inequality by (r + 2p)(r + p)r(1 + x)=(Rp) yields
r
2 + (p ¡ r)(2p + r)x + p(2rx ¡ 2p ¡ r)x
1+r=p > 0:
Denote the left-hand side of this inequality as f(x).24 Then
f
0(x) = (r + 2p)[2rx
1+r=p ¡ (p + r)x
r=p + (p ¡ r)];
f
















First observe that f(0) = r2 > 0, f(1) = 0, f0(1) = 0, f00(1) = r(r+p)(r+2p)=p >
0. Moreover, for p · r, the function f is decreasing on interval (0;1), since
f0(x) < (r + 2p)[2rxr=p ¡ (p + r)xr=p + (p ¡ r)] = (r + 2p)(p ¡ r)(1 ¡ xr=p) < 0.
Hence, f(x) > f(1) = 0, for p · r.
On the other hand, for p > r we have f0(0) = (r + 2p)(p ¡ r) > 0. Therefore,
f(x) > f(0) in some neighborhood of 0. Now, assume by contradiction that
f(x0) = 0 for some x0 2 (0;1). Then (according to Rolle's theorem) there exists
some x1 2 (0;x0) such that f(x1) = f(0), which implies that there exist some
x2 2 (0;x1) and x3 2 (x0;1) such that f0(x2) = f0(x3) = 0 = f0(1). Therefore,
the equation f00(x) = 0 has at least two solutions in interval (0;1), which is a
contradiction, since f00(x) = 0 only if x = 1
2. This proves that contract C11
1 is
preferred to contract C4.
Now, we will show that for A11 > 0, contract C11
1 is preferred to C11
3 . Obviously
the latter contract is a limiting case of the former, when the research horizon is
24Note that f is C2 on (0;1].
40in¯nity. However, for contract C11





1 with research horizon T 11
1 is more pro¯table for the venture
capitalist than contract C11
1 with any other research horizon, including in¯nite
research horizon.25 Therefore, contract C11
1 is better than contract C11
3 .
It remains to prove that contract C11
1 is preferred to contract C11
2 , i.e., that
V 11
0;1 ¡ 2E11
0;1 > V 11
0;2 ¡ 2E11




0;2 given in Table 5.





























Using again the substitution (12), we obtain e¡pT11
1 = x and e¡pT11
2 = x(p + r)=r ¢
[r ¡p+(r +p)xr=p]=[r +(r +2p)x1+r=p]. Then, the above inequality can be, after
multiplying by r(p + r)(2p + r)(1 + x)=(Rpx2+r=p), rewritten as follows:26






r ¡ p + (r + p)xr=p
r + (r + 2p)x1+r=p
¸1+r=p
> 0:
Similarly as in the ¯rst part of this proof, denote the left-hand side of this inequal-
ity as g(x). Observe that g(1) = 0 and that
g
0(x) =






r ¡ p + (r + p)xr=p





r2(x ¡ 1) + p2x(xr=p ¡ 1)
r + (r + 2p)x1+r=p ;
which is negative, since 0 < x < 1. Therefore, g(x) > g(1) = 0 for all x 2 [0;1),
which completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
1. Using the expressions for V 11
0 , E11
0 , V 1
0 , and E1








2 ¡ pr ¡ r








(p + r)(r + 2p)2
£
c(r + p)(r + 2p) ¡ pr(Rp ¡ c) +
+(Rp ¡ c)
¡
¡ (r + 2p)
2e
¡(r+p)T + 2p(r + p)e
¡(r+2p)T¢¤
;
25One can easily see that d
dT (V 11
0;1 ¡ 2E11
0;1) < 0 for T > T 11
1 .
26Note that r ¡p+(r +p)xr=p > 0, since A11 = ¡Rpx=[r(r +p)(1+x)]¢[r ¡p+(r +p)xr=p].
41with T being the optimal stopping time for contracts C11
1 and C11
4 from




Similarly as in the Proof of Proposition 1 we use the substitution (12),
or c = Rp x






or r = zp. Given the conditions on parameters, we have x 2 (0;1) and
z > 0. With this substitution, e¡rT simpli¯es to a nice form xz and the
above expressions can be rewritten as follows:
A
10 =
x[1 ¡ z ¡ z2 ¡ (1 + z)2xz + zx1+z]
(1 + x)z(1 + z)2 ;
B
10 =
¡z + (1 + z)(2 + z)x ¡ (2 + z)2x1+z + 2(1 + z)x2+z
(1 + x)(1 + z)(2 + z)2 :
For simplicity denote a(x) and b(x) the numerators of A10 and B10, respec-
tively. Note that the signs of A10 and B10 are the same as the signs of a(x)
and b(x), respectively.
We discuss two cases. First, when 1 ¡ z ¡ z2 · 0, then a(x) < 0, since
¡(1 + z)2xz + zx1+z = [¡(1 + z + z2) ¡ z(1 ¡ x)]xz < 0. Second, when the
inequality 1¡z ¡z2 > 0 holds, we will prove a stronger statement that this
inequality already implies b(x) < 0, regardless of the sign of a(x). Note that




0:6180. Obviously b(0) = ¡z and b(1) = 0. Taking the derivatives of b(x)
we obtain
b










00(x) = (1 + z)(2 + z)x
¡1+z[2(1 + z)x ¡ z(2 + z)]:
Then b0(0) = (1 + z)(2 + z) > 0 and b0(1) = (1 + z)(2 + z)(1 ¡ z) > 0. The
second derivative implies that b is concave in the interval (0;x1) and convex
on (x1;1), where x1 =
z(2+z)
2(1+z) < 1
2, according to the assumption 1¡z¡z2 > 0.
Therefore, b has a local maximum (denote it x2) on interval (0;x1) and a
local minimum on (x1;1). Its possible shape is illustrated on Figure 4 in
Appendix B Hence, in order to prove that b(x) < 0 on (0;1) it remains to
show that b(x2) < 0. Although it is not possible to ¯nd a closed formula for





z + 2(1 ¡ x2)
:
42Using this, we obtain
2[z + 2(1 ¡ x2)]b(x2) =
= 2[¡z + x2(1 + z)(2 + z)][z + 2(1 ¡ x2)] ¡
¡2(2 + z)
2x2 + 4(1 + z)x
2
2 =




2 + 4z + 6)x2 ¡ z(2 + z) =
= ¡[2(1 + z)x2 ¡ z(2 + z)]
2 + z[z + 2(1 ¡ x2)](z
2 + 2z ¡ 2) <
< 2z[z + 2(1 ¡ x2)](z
2 + z ¡ 1) < 0:
As a consequence, A10 > 0 implies that G0(T) > 0 for all T ¸ 0. Hence the
optimal stoping time is in¯nite.
2. The optimality condition G(T) = 0 can be rewritten as e¡pT =
(r+p)A10
(r+2p)B10.
The condition (r+2p)B10 < (r+p)A10 < 0 implies that e¡pT10
2 2 (0;1), i.e.,
T 10
2 is positive and ¯nite. Moreover, we have G00(T) = (r+2p)2B10e¡(r+2p)T¡
(r + p)2A10e¡(r+p)T, which yields G00(T 10
2 ) = (r + p)pA10e¡(r+p)T < 0.
3. We consider two cases. If B10 ¸ 0, then obviously G0(T) < 0. If B10 < 0,
then G0(T) < [¡(r + 2p)B10 + (r + p)A10]e¡(r+p)T < 0 for all T ¸ 0. Hence,
G(T) is monotonically decreasing and the optimal stoping time is zero.
A.6 Proof and numerical simulations for Proposition 2
1. Contract C4 is feasible whenever Rp > 2c. If the second stopping rule is
applied, the optimal stopping time is in¯nity (see discussion in Section 4)
and contract C10
3 is feasible.
The conditions A10 > 0 and B10 < 0 imply that pE11
0 + 2c < (r + p)E1
0 and
(r +2p)V 1
0 < p(R+V 11
0 )¡2c respectively. Moreover, from V 1
0 > E1
0 > 0 we
get (r + p)E1
0 < (r + 2p)V 1





p(R + V 11










p(R + V 11
0 ) ¡ 2c
> 0;
which means that contract C10
1 is feasible. We have proved that if the fea-
sibility condition A10 > 0 is satis¯ed, then the pool of available contracts
is C4, C10
1 , C10
3 . Further we will compare the surplus which the venture
capitalist retains with each contract, in order to choose the optimal one.
Consider contracts C4 and C10
3 . From the Proof of Lemma 1 we know that
contract for A10 > 0, the contract C10
3 is optimal among all contracts with
43stoping rule 2. As contract C4 is a degenerate case of this stoping rule (when
the research horizon is zero), condition A10 > 0 then implies that C10
3 Â C4.27
Further, let us compare contract C10
1 and contract C10
3 . In case of contract
C10







0 )¡2c. However, if the ¯nancing horizon is in¯nite,
then C10
1 is identical to contract C10
3 . Hence, the former contract is always
preferred to the latter.
In summary we get C10
1 Â C10
3 Â C4. Hence, the optimal contract is C10
1 .
Note that condition A10 > 0 implies that E1
0 > EF
0;1 + EL
0;1. In other words,
competing entrepreneurs together require less compensation, than would a
single entrepreneur.
2. Assume that 0 > A10(r+p) > B10(r+2p). According to Lemma 1, contract
C10












p(R + V 11) ¡ 2c
r + 2p
:
Hence, the inequality A10(r + p) > B10(r + 2p) implies that
0 < (pE
11
0 + 2c) ¡ E
1
0(r + p) < [p(R + V
11
0 ) ¡ 2c] ¡ V
1
0 (r + 2p):
Since E1
0(r + p) < V 1
0 (r + 2p), it necessarily must be that pE11
0 + 2c <
p(R + V 11
0 ) ¡ 2c. Hence, T 10
1 > 0 and contract C10
1 is feasible as well.
Therefore, the pool of contracts consists of C10
1 , C10
2 and C4.
Let us ¯rst compare contracts C10
1 and C10
2 . The former contract is preferred






















where all value functions are given in Table 6 in Appendix B. After straight-
















In that case, contract C10
1 is optimal. Otherwise, the optimal contract is
C10
2 .
27The relation \Â" is used to denote preferences between contracts from the viewpoint of the
venture capitalists, i.e., that one contract generates a larger pro¯t for the venture capitalist than
another one.
44Note, that now it is su±cient to prove, that C10
2 is preferred to contract C4,
always when the feasibility condition 0 > A10(r + p) > B10(r + 2p) holds.
If this is the case, then C10
1 will be optimal, when C10
1 Â C10
2 Â C4 and C10
2
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where A10 and B10 are de¯ned above. Consider now two cases:






(b) If A10 · B10 < 0 we show numerically that (14) holds. In the numeri-
cal simulations we considered without loss of generality (see Remark 1)
values r = 0:05 and R = 1. Using a grid 0:001 £ 0:001 on the set of all
positive (p;c), such that p > 2c and
r+2p
r+p B10 < A10 · B10 < 0, we plot-
ted points where pro¯t of the venture capitalist under contract C10
2 ex-
ceeds his pro¯t under contract C4. The simulations show that this is the
case everywhere in the de¯ned domain. Figure 5 illustrates the case for





3. According to Lemma 1, condition A10(r + p) < B10(r + 2p) implies that
contract C10
2 is not feasible. Moreover, condition (2c+E11
0 ) < p(R+V 11
0 )¡
2c implies that C10
1 is feasible. Therefore, we choose the optimal contract
between C10
1 and C4. Using numerical simulations, we have veri¯ed that
in domain R4, given that the feasibility conditions are satis¯ed for contract
C10
1 , the venture capitalist prefers to ¯nance the leader alone (contract C4 is
better than contract C10
1 ). Again, the numerical simulations were performed
for r = 0:05 and R = 1, using a grid of 0:001 £ 0:001 for parameters (p;c).
4. If (2c + E11
0 ) > p(R + V 11
0 ) ¡ 2c, the only feasible (hence, optimal) contract
is C4.
45B Appendix: Tables and ¯gures












Figure 3: Feasibility of contracts in regime (1=0)
Notes to Figure 3:
1. Contract C10
1 is feasible in domains A, B and C;
2. Contract C10
2 is feasible in domain B;
3. Contract C10
3 is feasible in domain A;
4. Contract C4 is feasible in domains A,B,C and D.
x




Figure 4: Shape of function b(x)










Figure 5: Regime (1=0): Illustration for Case 2; p = 0:5, r = 0:05.
Notes to Tables 5 and 6:
1. Stopping rules are the following:
(a) Rule 1: both entrepreneurs are ¯nanced at most for T
ij
k periods.
(b) Rule 2: both entrepreneurs are ¯nanced for at most T
ij
k periods. If
no change of regime occurred, then in regime (1=0) the Follower is
abandoned and the Leader is ¯nanced at most for additional T 1 periods.
In regime (1=1), one of the entrepreneurs is randomly chosen and is
¯nanced for at most T 1 periods.
(c) Rule 3: a single entrepreneur is ¯nanced for T 1 periods at most.
2. The feasibility conditions ensure that the optimal ¯nancing horizon is pos-
itive or in¯nite, depending on the contract. Recall that we always assume
that Rp > 2c.
47C
1
1
1
C
1
1
2
C
1
1
3
C
4
S
t
o
p
i
n
g
r
u
l
e
R
u
l
e
1
R
u
l
e
2
R
u
l
e
2
R
u
l
e
3
S
h
a
r
e
o
f
e
n
t
r
e
p
.
s
1
1
t
;
1
=
c
p
+
E
1
1
t
s
1
1
t
;
2
=
c
p
+
E
1
1
t
s
1
1
t
;
3
=
c
p
+
E
1
1
t
s
1
t
=
c
p
+
E
1
t
V
a
l
u
e
f
n
c
t
.
E
1
1
t
;
1
=
c
r
+
p
¢
E
1
1
t
;
2
=
³
1
2
E
1
0
¡
c
r
+
p
´
¢
E
1
1
t
;
3
=
c
r
+
p
E
1
t
=
c
r
¡
1
¡
e
¡
r
(
T
¡
t
)
¢
o
f
e
n
t
r
e
p
.
¢
¡
1
¡
e
¡
(
r
+
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
¢
¢
e
¡
(
r
+
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
+
c
r
+
p
V
a
l
u
e
o
f
V
1
1
t
;
1
=
2
(
R
p
¡
c
)
r
+
2
p
¢
V
1
1
t
;
2
=
³
V
1
0
¡
2
(
R
p
¡
c
)
r
+
2
p
´
¢
V
1
1
t
;
3
=
2
(
R
p
¡
c
)
r
+
2
p
V
1
t
=
R
p
¡
c
r
+
p
¢
t
h
e
v
e
n
t
u
r
e
¢
¡
1
¡
e
¡
(
r
+
2
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
¢
¢
e
¡
(
r
+
2
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
+
2
(
R
p
¡
c
)
r
+
2
p
¢
¡
1
¡
e
¡
(
r
+
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
¢
O
p
t
i
m
a
l
t
i
m
e
T
1
1
1
=
¡
1
p
l
n
c
R
p
¡
c
T
1
1
2
=
¡
1
p
l
n
r
+
p
r
+
2
p
E
1
0
¡
2
c
r
+
p
V
1
0
¡
2
(
R
p
¡
c
)
r
+
2
p
T
1
1
3
!
1
T
1
=
¡
1
p
l
n
c
R
p
¡
c
F
e
a
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
c
o
n
d
i
t
.
0
>
A
1
1
(
r
+
p
)
>
B
1
1
(
r
+
2
p
)
A
1
1
>
0
T
a
b
l
e
5
:
C
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
a
n
d
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
s
:
r
e
g
i
m
e
(
1
=
1
)
48C
1
0
1
C
1
0
2
C
1
0
3
C
4
S
t
o
p
i
n
g
r
u
l
e
R
u
l
e
1
R
u
l
e
2
R
u
l
e
2
R
u
l
e
3
S
h
a
r
e
o
f
t
h
e
L
.
s
1
1
t
;
1
=
c
p
+
E
F
t
;
1
¡
E
1
1
0
s
L
t
;
2
=
c
p
+
E
L
t
;
2
s
L
t
;
3
=
c
p
+
E
L
0
;
3
s
L
t
=
s
1
t
=
c
p
+
E
1
t
V
a
l
u
e
f
n
c
t
.
E
L
t
;
1
=
c
+
p
E
1
1
0
r
+
p
¢
E
L
t
;
2
=
³
E
1
0
¡
c
+
p
E
1
1
0
r
+
p
´
¢
E
L
t
;
3
=
c
+
p
E
1
1
0
r
+
p
E
1
t
=
c
r
¡
1
¡
e
¡
r
(
T
¡
t
)
¢
o
f
t
h
e
L
.
¢
¡
1
¡
e
¡
(
r
+
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
¢
¢
e
¡
(
r
+
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
+
c
+
p
E
1
1
0
r
+
p
S
h
a
r
e
o
f
t
h
e
F
.
s
F
t
;
1
=
c
p
+
E
F
t
;
1
¡
E
1
1
0
s
F
t
;
2
=
c
p
+
E
F
t
;
2
¡
E
1
1
0
s
F
t
;
3
=
c
p
+
E
F
t
;
3
¡
E
1
1
0
V
a
l
u
e
f
n
c
t
.
E
F
t
;
1
=
c
r
+
p
¢
E
F
t
;
2
=
c
r
+
p
¡
1
¡
e
¡
(
r
+
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
¢
E
F
t
;
3
=
c
r
+
p
o
f
t
h
e
F
.
¢
(
1
¡
e
¡
(
r
+
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
)
V
a
l
u
e
o
f
V
1
0
t
;
1
=
p
(
R
+
V
1
1
0
)
¡
2
c
r
+
2
p
¢
V
1
0
t
;
2
=
³
V
1
0
¡
p
(
R
+
V
1
1
0
)
¡
2
c
r
+
2
p
´
¢
V
1
0
t
;
3
=
p
(
R
+
V
1
1
0
)
¡
2
c
r
+
2
p
V
1
t
=
R
p
¡
c
r
+
p
¢
t
h
e
v
e
n
t
u
r
e
¢
¡
1
¡
e
¡
(
r
+
2
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
¢
¢
e
¡
(
r
+
2
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
+
p
(
R
+
V
1
1
0
)
¡
2
c
r
+
2
p
¢
¡
1
¡
e
¡
(
r
+
p
)
(
T
¡
t
)
¢
O
p
t
i
m
a
l
t
i
m
e
T
1
0
1
=
¡
1
p
l
n
2
c
+
p
E
1
1
0
p
(
R
+
V
1
1
0
)
¡
2
c
T
1
0
2
=
¡
1
p
l
n
r
+
p
r
+
2
p
E
1
0
¡
2
c
+
p
E
1
1
0
r
+
p
V
1
0
¡
p
(
R
+
V
1
1
0
)
¡
2
c
r
+
2
p
T
1
0
3
!
1
T
1
=
¡
1
p
l
n
c
R
p
¡
c
F
e
a
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
c
o
n
d
.
2
c
+
E
1
1
0
<
p
(
R
+
V
1
1
0
)
¡
2
c
0
>
A
1
0
(
r
+
p
)
>
B
1
0
(
r
+
2
p
)
A
1
0
>
0
T
a
b
l
e
6
:
C
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
a
n
d
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
s
:
r
e
g
i
m
e
(
1
=
0
)
49